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This article explores the relationship between country membership in major intergovernmental organisations and economic
freedom. While it makes no claims to have found any broad theoretically bound, robust causal mechanism, baseline ﬁxed effects
models establish relationships amongst economic freedom and membership in the EU, NATO, WTO, UN, OECD, World Bank,
and IMF. Though the results are not simple, the strongest ﬁndings are negative relationships with the UN, IMF, and WTO, and
positive relationships with the World Bank and possibly the EU.
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1. Introduction
How does membership in intergovernmental organisations affect the quality of institutions?
According to certain elements of the populist right, the situation is dire: Here Come the Black
Helicopters (Morris and McGann 2012), Global Tyranny… Step by Step (Jasper 1992). Fear of
intergovernmental organisations is perhaps even more pervasive amongst the populist left, although
for entirely different reasons (Chomsky 1999; Klein 2007). While the conspiratorial thinking implicit
in this literature is dismissed by the ivory tower, it nonetheless constitutes a falsiﬁable hypothesis.
Whereas disproving pure conspiracy theories is intractable, social scientists have accessible data to
test the idea that intergovernmental organisations have a detrimental effect on institutional quality.
Beyond the broad strokes of the macro question of intergovernmental organisations, the issue is also
highly relevant to Britain’s referendum on its membership of the European Union (EU) to be held
on 23 June 2016.
This article concludes that international institutions have, at best, a mixed effect on economic
institutions. It measures the effect of membership in eight intergovernmental organisations in ﬁxed
effects regressions. The identiﬁcation method is hardly unassailable, but even if all the correlations
measured are spurious, the alternative explanations are, by and large, unsupportive of the position
that joining most intergovernmental organisations is a harbinger of liberty, growth, and prosperity.
The results are not uniform, but the interpretation remains disturbing. For example, under a
reasonable baseline speciﬁcation, membership in the World Trade Organization is detrimental.
While ﬁndings regarding, for example, membership in the EU aremore positive, the negative impact
of intergovernmental organisations on government involvement in the economy goes some way to
support the ‘Black Helicopters’ interpretation, albeit in less paranoid terms.
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Other literature has attempted to measure the impact of membership in intergovernmental
organisations on institutions (e.g. Rose 2004; Haughton 2007; Lejour and deMooij 2005; Zurn 2000).1
Speciﬁc mechanisms are discussed in section 2. The associations may be direct (stipulations
regarding trade), indirect, or spurious – though spurious in an interesting way. This article measures
institutions in this context in terms of economic freedom. It uses the measure of economic freedom
employed by Hall et al. (2011) and Tarabar and Young (2014), which has been shown to rigorously
relate to growth (de Haan et al. 2006) and has been extensively used elsewhere to study a variety of
issues (see Hall and Lawson 2014).
The layout of this article is as follows. Section 2 introduces the data and method employed in the
article. Many caveats must be stated regarding the robustness of what could be found. Section 3
presents the results; there were certain unforeseen difﬁculties in applying the described method to
the data. Section 4 concludes.
2. Data and model
This article employs ﬁxed effects regressions with controls for logged real GDP per capita fromWorld
Development Indicators and the Polity IV index (Marshall et al. 2014) to assess the relationships
between membership in intergovernmental organisations and economic freedom.2 A simple
membership dummy and the natural log of the number of years as a member are simultaneously
employed. Economic Freedom, the dependent variable, is measured by theEconomic Freedom of the
World (EFW) index (Gwartney et al. 2015). Because the time dimension of the question is more
salient, the chain-linked version of the economic freedom index was employed. The data set includes
the years 1970–2013, with countries and years dictated primarily by EFW, though at times the Polity
IVandGDP data also act as binding constraints. Table 1 provides descriptive statistics of all data, and
Table 2 provides the correlation matrix of the membership dummies.
Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Variable obs mean std min max
Economic Freedom 4,572 6.12 1.31 1.78 9.15
EU Membership 5,412 0.12 0.33 0 1
Log Years EU 5,412 0.28 0.85 0 3.76
UNMembership 5,412 0.96 0.20 0 1
Log Years UN 5,412 3.06 1.22 0 4.22
WTO Membership 5,412 0.77 0.42 0 1
Log Years WTO 5,412 2.37 1.55 0 4.19
NATO Membership 5,412 0.15 0.36 0 1
Log Years NATO 5,412 0.50 1.24 0 4.16
OECDMembership 5,412 0.21 0.41 0 1
Log Years OECD 5,412 0.67 1.32 0 3.95
World Bank
Membership 5,412 0.91 0.28 0 1
Log Years World
Bank Membership 5,412 3.06 1.15 0 4.22
IMF Membership 5,412 0.92 0.27 0 1
Log Years IMF 5,412 3.11 1.11 0 4.22
Logged GDP per
capita 4,850 8.11 1.63 4.96 11.36
Polity IV 4,964 2.42 7.31 –10 10
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All intergovernmental organisations that had a sufﬁcient number of countries and variation in
joining dates were included, for a total of eight. There are many other intergovernmental
organisations, but none possessed the statistical properties necessary for the analysis. For example,
the Latin American Integration Association has only 13 members and the Shanghai Cooperation
Organisation has only six. Those intergovernmental organisations which were included are the
European Union (EU), the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD),
theUnited Nations (UN), theNorthAtlantic TreatyOrganization (NATO), theWorld Bank, and the
World Trade Organization (WTO).3
With year and country ﬁxed effects, the method employed has some semblance to identiﬁcation,
but causality is not established. What is of interest is that these estimates often achieve statistical
signiﬁcance despite the ﬁxed effects and high degree of multicollinearity, as exhibited in the
correlation matrix (see Table 2). It is not simply the direct or indirect effects of membership in these
organisations which is interesting, but also what the membership may be endogenous to. Because the
regression analysis ﬁnds large negative effects, perhaps the magnitude of the effects is not believable.
However, what membership signals about a country is almost as interesting as the raw effects of
membership. Moreover, in the presence of year and country ﬁxed effects, with the character of the
government and the level of development controlled for, there are only so many concrete, tangible
variables that membership can be endogenous to.
Still, concretising possible mechanisms provides important guidance for interpreting the results in
section 3. The direct effects include, for example, the quasi-requirement of NATOmembers to spend
at least 2 per cent of theirGDP on themilitary, sanctions imposed by theWTO, or conditions imposed
by the IMF for its loans. The EU, amongst other things, creates a signiﬁcant free trade area, although
the overall effect of the EUmay be to ‘ﬂatten’ the institutional differences amongst the countries. For
instance, Estonia had to raise tariffs up from zero when it prepared to join (Weber and Taube 2000).
Intergovernmental organisations may also ensconce bad governments in power, ultimately acting
counterproductively despite ostensible improvements in policy (Easterly 2014). Indirectly,
membership in these organisations may inﬂuence the ideology or perceptions of government ofﬁcials
or opinion leaders of the country. Another indirect mechanism may be the mimetic isomorphism
amongst countries fuelled by membership (cf. Frumkin and Galaskiewicz 2004).
Alternatively, ﬁndings may be considered statistical artefacts. Membership in NATO during the
Cold War signalled allegiance to the United States and a preference for the mixed market economy
over socialism. Countries that wish to become more open to world markets may feel incentivised to
join any or all of these organisations. Ultimately, in the absence of a better method of identiﬁcation,
the results are susceptible to these or similar speculations and counter-arguments related to
endogeneity.
Table 2: Correlation matrix of intergovernmental dummy variable
EU UN WTO NATO OECD Wld Bk IMF
EU 1.00
UN 0.07 1.00
WTO 0.19 0.14 1.00
NATO 0.69 0.08 0.22 1.00
OECD 0.61 0.03 0.29 0.72 1.00
World Bank 0.11 0.56 0.38 0.13 0.13 1.00
IMF 0.11 0.59 0.37 0.12 0.12 0.94 1.00
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However, the regression results can give us an idea of what joining these organisations may
portend for the future trajectory of economic freedom within a given country. Even if it is accepted
that the lack of a ﬁrm theoretical foundation of the statistical tests limits our conﬁdence in the
external validity of the results, at worst these estimations provide a basis for historical interpretation
of the path of economic freedom for the in-sample countries historically.4 And that is not a trivial
matter; what of the recent history of institutional quality, economic policy, and the effects of
membership in the European Union? Regardless of what is driving the results, these issues are
relevant to the debate about Britain’s possible exit from the EU (‘Brexit’) and to the source of the
disagreement amongst pro-market groups within the UK (The Economist 2016; Ridley 2016). Thus,
even if these regression results are viewed with all possible scepticism regarding causality and
endogeneity, they still amount to ﬁndings that should colour our views regarding intergovernmental
organisations and economic freedom.
3. Results
In this section, the effects of the intergovernmental organisations on the Economic Freedom of the
World index are estimated. Table 3 provides baseline regression results. Regression (1) employs no
year ﬁxed effects and no country ﬁxed effects. Regression (2) employs only year ﬁxed effects, and
Regression (3) employs only country ﬁxed effects. Regression (4) employs both country and year
ﬁxed effects and is considered to give the main results for this article. Results for the control variables
are unreported but are on the RHS in all regressions along with robust standard errors. One
signiﬁcant issue arose regarding the implementation of the model. There are only seven countries
that did not join the World Bank the same year they joined the IMF: Croatia, Barbados, Malta,
Poland, Slovenia, and Czech Republic/Slovakia. None of these countries has complete data for all
control variables plus EFW. This means there is perfect multicollinearity for measuring membership
(though not years of membership) for simultaneously the World Bank and the IMF. To address this,
in the baseline regressions the IMF dummy is omitted.
A 0.25 standard deviation change in EFW is 0.328. The absolute value of many of the coefﬁcients
in Regression (4) is within the vicinity of this. The dummy forWorld Bankmembership is minus 1.18,
almost a full standard deviation, but the negative sign is mitigated by two factors. One is that the
coefﬁcient for logged years of membership in the World Bank is 0.914, so relatively quickly the net
effect is positive. The second is that the dummy for World Bank membership is really a dummy for
the effect of membership in theWorld Bank but also in the IMF; in this one case there are literally no
data for distinguishing the effect of one from the other.
To summarise the results, with any statistically insigniﬁcant coefﬁcient to zero rounded down for
simplicity’s sake, the effect of the EU is borderline positive, the effects of theUN,WTO, and IMF are
negative, the effects of NATO and the World Bank are ambiguous (because the signs of the log of
years and membership dummy coefﬁcients conﬂict even though both are statistically signiﬁcant), and
the OECD has no statistically signiﬁcant effect. The dummy variable for the UN is statistically
signiﬁcant despite being equal to one in 96 per cent of observations.5 The results for WTO
membership, the log of years of NATO membership, World Bank membership, and the log of years
of World Bank membership are most robust across the four speciﬁcations.
Figures A1–7 rectify the ambiguities and make the point more clearly by graphing the two effects
over time (using both point estimates for all variables, even if they are statistically insigniﬁcant). The
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results from Table 3 may be more clearly understood in terms of these ﬁgures. After 20 years, there
are positive effects from the EU and the World Bank, negative effects from the UN and the IMF,
minute negative effects from theWTO, and approximately zero effects from NATO and the OECD.
But the question of the overall effect of membership in intergovernmental organisations remains
unanswered.
This is addressed with a counterfactual of what economic freedom would look like in the United
States if it had not been a member of any of these organisations (or had not been the type of country
that self-selects into membership, etc. This ignores EU membership as well). The long-run effects of
the intergovernmental organisations are extreme and negative as applied to the United States. The
point estimates actually slightly eclipse the maximal value of ten at the turn of the millennium. The
effect also grows very slowly, fromminus1.23 in 1970 tominus 1.47 in 2013. This suggests the long-run
impact of the organisations may be large.
There remain two concerns regarding the results. The ﬁrst is that we should at least try to separate
the effect of the dummy for the IMF and for theWorld Bank. Perfect multicollinearity can be avoided
by omitting variables, which I performed despite the omitting variable bias. These regressions can be
found in Table 4. Besides the explicitly noted differences, the speciﬁcations are otherwise identical to
Table 3: Baseline regression results









EU Membership 0.110*** –0.037 0.002 –0.024









UN Membership –0.004 –0.032** –0.153 –0.364***









WTO Membership 0.095*** 0.054*** 0.175** 0.021









NATO Membership –0.442*** –0.134*** –0.187* –0.190*









OECDMembership 0.169*** 0.046* –0.001 –0.084
Logged Years (0.038) (0.027) (0.111) (0.110)








World Bank Membership 0.296*** 0.430*** 0.723** 0.914***
Logged Years (0.059) (0.040) (0.326) (0.228)
IMF Membership 0.220*** –0.246*** 0.223 –0.459***
Logged Years (0.062) (0.044) (0.312) (0.258)
Year FE? N Y N Y
Country FE? N N Y Y
R2 0.517 0.618 0.499 0.572
n 4,124 4,124 4,124 4,124
* = conﬁdence at 90%; ** = conﬁdence at 95%; *** = conﬁdence at 99%.
Robust standard errors were employed. All regressions control for Polity IVand logged real GDP per capita. IMF Membership omitted due to perfect
multicollinearity.
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Regression (4). Regression (5) removes the World Bank dummy variable, Polity IV, and the log of
output per capita. Under those conditions, IMF has a negative, statistically signiﬁcant effect.
Regression (6) includes the log of output per capita and Polity IV. This is, in practice, identical to the
regression run in Regression (4), with the effect ascribed to the IMF instead of the World Bank.
Regression (7) removes Polity IVand adds back in the World Bank dummy, and in this instance all
variables lose signiﬁcance.6 Note also that the combined effect of the IMF and the World Bank
dummies in Regression (7) are not too distant from the effect of the World Bank dummy alone in
Regression (4).
The second issue is interpretation. Perhaps these intergovernmental organisations encourage
government spending (as in requiring governments to invest in human capital as a condition of
receiving IMF loan guarantees) or increase standards of product market regulation (as in the
EU), but one may think that they should still have a positive impact on freedom to trade
internationally (Area 4 in EFW). This was tested in Table 5. Regression (8) is the same as
Regression (4) except that it replaces the EFW index with freedom to trade internationally.
Regressions (9)–(12) break it down further to the four components of Area 4: 4A (tariffs), 4B
(regulatory trade barriers), 4C (black market exchange rates), and 4D (controls of the movement
of capital and people).
If we evaluate Regression (8) as we did with Regression (4), the OECD has contradictory,
ambiguous effects. The World Bank and the EU have positive effects. The IMF has negative
effects. The WTO does not have statistically signiﬁcant effects and has possibly detrimental
effects on 4D. The UN does not have statistically signiﬁcant effects. Regressions (10) and (12)
omit the World Bank membership dummy due to further perfect multicollinearity caused by
the reduction in sample size.
If we take all the results together in the context of the Brexit, the effect of membership in the
European Union remains unclear. The overall effect on economic freedom is contingent on
speciﬁcation, and no speciﬁcation yields especially strong results. There may be more concrete
answers regarding its effect on freedom to trade, however. Scores for tariffs, regulatory trade barriers,








IMF Membership 0.179 –0.459*** 0.158
Logged Years (0.275) (0.011) (0.372)
World Bank Membership –0.557
(0.529)
Include World Bank Membership? N N Y
Include Polity IV? N Y N
Include LnRGDPcap? N Y Y
Include all other controls? Y Y Y
Include all ﬁxed effects? Y Y Y
R2 0.306 0.572 0.569
n 4,572 4,124 4,358
* = conﬁdence at 90%; ** = conﬁdence at 95%; *** = conﬁdence at 99%.
Robust standard errors were employed. These regressions are otherwise identical to Regression (4), found in Table 3.
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and controls of the movement of capital and people seem to improve upon entry into the EU, but the
net effect is negative relatively quickly for all three. The results imply that EU membership may at
ﬁrst have beneﬁted the UK by promoting free trade, but this is unlikely to hold true in the future.7
4. Conclusion
Perhaps intergovernmental organisations promote peaceful cooperation amongst countries. Perhaps
they are effective in helping coordinate humanitarian aid. But their relationship with the quality of
a country’s market-oriented institutions appears, broadly speaking, negative. Entangling alliances
may in fact be entangling, heralding declines in institutional quality. As for Brexit speciﬁcally, the
overall effect of the EU is unclear, but the UK’s gains in freedom to trade from the EU have likely
at this point been dissipated.
Table 5: Freedom to trade internationally
LHS EFWArea 4 4A 4B 4C 4D











EU Membership –0.272 –0.522*** –0.372*** –0.295** –0.637***











UN Membership –0.311 –0.840** –0.251 –0.225 0.302











WTO Membership 0.072 0.206 0.325 –0.162 –0.506











NATO Membership –0.406 0.013 –0.320** –0.050 –0.071











OECDMembership –0.574*** –1.366*** –0.237 –0.965*** 0.145
Logged Years (0. 203) (0.312) (0.197) (0.280) (0.397)







World Bank Membership 1.370** 3.181 0.581 0.576 2.925
Logged Years (0.645) (2.492) (1.077) (1.183) (2.423)
IMF Membership –1.326** –4.066 –0.023 0.636 –1.933
Logged Years (0.658) (2.561) (1.027) (1.192) (2.265)
Year FE? Y Y Y Y Y
Country FE? Y Y Y Y Y
R2 0.479 0.026 0.556 0.217 0.425
n 4,226 3,215 1,704 4,510 1,683
* = conﬁdence at 90%; ** = conﬁdence at 95%; *** = conﬁdence at 99%.
†Variable dropped due to perfect multicollinearity.
EFW, Economic Freedom of the World (Gwartney et al. 2015).
Robust standard errors were employed. All regressions control for Polity IVand logged real GDP per capita. IMF Membership omitted due to perfect
multicollinearity.
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One great irony is the vociferous populist ‘anti-globalisation’ protests against theWTO in 1999 in
Seattle. Perhaps trade barriers would have been decreased in their absence, but if anything it appears
that the WTO is an obstacle to economic liberalisation. Naomi Klein may have had it backwards.
There may not be black helicopters on the horizon ready to take away sovereignty and liberty, but
there is quite possibly a relationship between membership in these organisations and erosions of
economic freedom.
Appendix
Net effect of intergovernmental organisations on economic freedom
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Notes
1. See Ikenberry (1998–1999) for an alternative interpretation.
2. It is possible to run this analysis using alternative measures of institutions, including with Polity IV, but economic freedom
seems most appropriate given that the political right seems primarily concerned about creeping socialism.
3. Years of entering membership can be found in various online sources: European Union (2015) for the EU, OECD (2015),
UN (n.d.), USDepartment of State (2009) for NATO, IMF (2012),World Bank (n.d.) (the list used was for the International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development), and WTO (n.d.). The World Trade Organization’s predecessor, the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), was considered to be the same organisation as the WTO.
4. Suppose the mechanism by which the WTO affected economic freedom was its sanctions against tariffs. Then a leadership
change and a policy of weakening these sanctions may eliminate its effectiveness in enhancing economic freedom. But since
the WTO could hypothetically affect economic freedom through other mechanisms, it would not be clear whether such a
development would justify anticipating a change in its impact. Because no deeply deﬁned theory is being tested,
out-of-sample predictions may not be expected to be reliable.
5. Omitting the two United Nations variables does not change the sign of any of the other variables of interest. It has only
modest impacts on coefﬁcients and t-statistics.
6. What would be the following regression in the table, omitting logged output per capita and including Polity IV, could not be
performed because of the perfect multicollinearity.
7. The component 4C, black-market exchange rates, shows only negative effects of EU membership, but it is not clear that
membership seriously threatens this type of market intervention in the UK speciﬁcally.
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